14:07Berlin · demo

mcp.cashu.exchange /pizza

21,400 sats

Pizza in Berlin

Delivered by facilitators you choose — and can verify.

🍕
Pizzeria Napoli
Kreuzberg · ★ 4.8 · 25–35 min
8 vetted
from 10,900
🍕
Trattoria Sole
Mitte · ★ 4.6 · 30–40 min
closed

Pizzeria Napoli

Margherita
San Marzano, fior di latte, basil
12,500
Quattro Formaggi
Gorgonzola, taleggio, pecorino, mozzarella
15,400
Diavola
Spianata piccante, chilli honey
14,900
Basket1 × Margherita
Total12,500 sats
DeliveryKreuzberg · 10999

Who is in your set?

Napoli makes the pizza. A facilitator carries it and settles the sats. You decide who may carry your orders — never which one does. The order is opened to the whole set: the first member who proves membership becomes your counterparty, and your client never learns which one it was.

Your pinned trust set

List—
Members—
Published—
Version hash—

Nothing names a winner up front, and the claimant's own claimed identity is ignored: a ring proof shows membership, not who sent it.

Verifying the claimant

Waiting for a member of your set to prove membership…

Pinned trust set

List—
Members—
Version hash—

What was checked

    Anonymity

    Try to cheat (live)

    Pay with bitcoin

    —
    —

    Requesting a real invoice from the mint…

    Invoice from the mint

    Mint—
    Network—
    Quote—
    Expires—
    Mint state—

    BOLT11

    —

    This is a real, payable signet invoice issued by the mint the worker already settles against (cdk-a056e0f.cashu.exchange). Nothing is simulated: the mint's own state machine is what the badge above reads. No sats move until somebody pays it — the demo holds no signet funds, so the paid → issued path is real code you can exercise by paying the invoice.

    Order —

    Facilitator—
    Trust proofverified
    Anonymity set—

    Honest limitation: the ring proof says who may settle the order, not that the pizza arrives. Releasing sats on delivery — not on proof — is the part that protects you. In this demo the release is simulated.